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STERN V. MARSHALL: A DEAD-END MARATHON?
Kent L. Richland∗
INTRODUCTION
If ten years ago a poll had been taken of lawyers asking them to predict the
individuals who would have the most significant impact on federal jurisdiction
law in the first decade of the 21st century, it’s a safe bet that Anna Nicole
Smith’s name would not have shown up on many ballots. But counterintuitive
as it may then have seemed, as it turned out, the late Ms. Smith left a
substantial imprint on the jurisprudence of federal jurisdiction: in that uniquely
American way pop culture has of filling every nook and cranny of our society,
litigation brought by Ms. Smith generated two of the most important United
States Supreme Court decisions on federal jurisdiction in the last ten years.
First, in 2006, the high court handed down Marshall v. Marshall, in which
Ms. Smith (whose married name was Vickie Lynn Marshall) successfully
sought review of the 9th Circuit’s reversal of an $89 million judgment in her
favor based on her claim that her stepson had interfered with an intended inter
vivos gift from her deceased billionaire husband. In reversing the 9th Circuit,
the Court clarified an issue of federal jurisdiction that had bedeviled the lower
federal courts for forty years: Resolving a four-way split among the circuits,
Justice Ginsburg’s unanimous opinion explained that the judge-made “probate
exception” to federal jurisdiction was to be applied narrowly, only foreclosed a
federal court from directly interfering with a state court’s probate of a will or
administration of an estate, and could not be used as an “end-around” federal
jurisdiction simply because a case was related to a state probate action.
Then, in 2011, the Court issued its opinion in Stern v. Marshall, in which
the late Ms. Smith’s estate had sought review of the 9th Circuit’s second
reversal of the same judgment.1 In a 5-4 ruling, the Court held that a nonArticle III bankruptcy court could not constitutionally render a final decision
on a bankruptcy estate’s state-law-based compulsory counterclaim to a proof
∗ Partner, Greines, Martin, Stein & Richland, Los Angeles, California; A.B., University of California,
Berkeley, 1968; J.D., U.C.L.A., 1971. The author wishes to thank Edward L. Xanders and Alan Diamond, his
co-counsel in Stern v. Marshall, and Edward Ong for his contributions to this article.
1 See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011).
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of claim filed by a creditor of the estate.2 Although characterized by the
majority as a “narrow” decision, the rationale adopted by the majority—as well
as the very nature of Article III and the jurisprudence that has developed
around it—could result in a significant shift of adjudicatory authority, not just
in the bankruptcy system, but potentially far more broadly.3
This article will focus on the Stern holding and its potentially serious
implications both inside and outside of bankruptcy. First, it will discuss the
problem presented by Article III and the relevant (but inconsistent) Supreme
Court cases before Stern. Then it will recount both the facts and legal analysis
of the Stern decision itself. Finally, it will consider perhaps the most troubling
question inherent in the Stern holding: what are its implications in light of the
established principle that, because of Article III’s structural, separation-ofpowers aspect, its application cannot be waived by the parties? Within the
answer to that question may lie the future effectiveness of not just the
bankruptcy courts, but of federal magistrates, federal arbitration, and other
non-Article III adjudicative bodies.
I. ARTICLE III ANALYSIS: FORMALISM VERSUS ALL-FACTORS BALANCING
A. Early Cases: The Development of Article III Formalism
By its terms, Article III is seemingly absolute. It vests the “judicial Power
of the United States” in “one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish,” and it provides that the
judges of those courts “shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour [sic],
and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which
shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.”4 By its terms,
then, Article III directs that only the federal courts can wield federal judicial
2

Id. at 2620.
Id. As of the date of this writing, bankruptcy and district courts across the country are considering a
wide variety of issues regarding the scope of the Stern holding and its effect on the jurisdiction of bankruptcy
courts to issue final decisions in a number of situations. But the potential for even broader impact has not gone
unnoticed. On September 9, 2011, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a sua sponte order in a pending
appeal, requesting supplemental briefing from the parties “addressing whether the reasoning of Stern applies to
magistrate judges, which, like bankruptcy judges, are not Article III judges, and whether, under Stern, a
magistrate judge can enter final judgment in a case tried to a magistrate judge by consent under 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c) where jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship and state law provides the rule of decision.”
Order at 2, Technical Automation Servs. Corp. v. Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp., No. 10-20640, 2012 WL 688520
(5th Cir. Mar. 5, 2012), available at http://stevesathersbankruptcynews.blogspot.com/2011/09/fifth-circuit-toconsider-impact-of.html (last visited February 19, 2012).
4 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
3
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power, and that those courts must be staffed by judges with life tenure whose
salaries may not be reduced during that tenure.
The problem is that, pursuant to its Article I powers, Congress—for good,
pragmatic reasons—has created a multiplicity of tribunals other than the
federal courts—for example, territorial courts, military courts, agency
tribunals, and bankruptcy courts. Do these so-called “legislative courts” violate
Article III?
From early on, the Supreme Court held that in many instances they did
not—at least, not if they fell within certain specific categories. For example, in
The American Insurance Company v. Canter, Chief Justice Marshall wrote on
behalf of a unanimous court that a territorial court created by Congress in the
territory of Florida, whose judges served for terms of four years, did not violate
Article III when it exercised admiralty jurisdiction.5 Although section 2 of
Article III provides that “[t]he judicial Power shall extend to . . . all Cases of
admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction,”6 Chief Justice Marshall explained that
the territorial courts
are not constitutional courts, in which the judicial power conferred by
the [C]onstitution on the general government can be deposited. They
are incapable of receiving it. They are legislative courts, created in
virtue of the general right of sovereignty which exists in the
government, or in virtue of that [Article I] clause which enables
[C]ongress to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the
7
territory belonging to the United States.

A more nuanced—and ultimately more influential—approach to Article III
was articulated in Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.8 In
that case, the Court changed its focus from the nature of the decision maker to
the nature of the matter under consideration.9
In Murray’s Lessee, the Treasury Department had summarily sold property
belonging to a customs collector who had failed to transfer to the government

5 Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. 511, 546 (1828). For Congress to create federal courts in the
territories, it would have presented a real practical problem: when and if the territory became a state and
established its own local court system, there would have been a surfeit of life-tenured federal judges left over
from the territorial courts.
6 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
7 Am. Ins. Co., 26 U.S. at 546.
8 Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272 (1855).
9 See id. at 283–85.
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customs funds he had collected.10 The plaintiff argued that the sale was void,
asserting that calculating the deficiency and selling the property were judicial
acts that could not be done by the executive branch under Article III.11
The Supreme Court upheld the Treasury Department sale, stating that while
Article III would prohibit Congress from
withdraw[ing] from judicial cognizance any matter which . . . is the
subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or
admiralty . . . there are matters, involving public rights . . . which
[C]ongress may or may not bring within the cognizance of the courts
12
of the United States, as it may deem proper.

The Court explained that the case before it was a “public rights” matter
because it could only be brought against the federal government; since the
federal government could be sued only if it chose to waive sovereign
immunity, it followed that the federal government could dictate the method by
which it could be held liable.13 Thus, the Murray’s Lessee court drew what
appeared to be a strict distinction between “public rights,” which could be
adjudicated by a non-Article III entity, and “private rights,” which could not.
But when the Court expressly considered whether a non-Article III federal
agency tribunal could decide a “private rights” dispute in Crowell v. Benson, it
came up with a surprising answer.14 Congress had set up a federal workers’
compensation scheme under which employers would pay compensation to
maritime workers injured on the job.15 Any factual dispute between employer
and employee—such as the nature and scope of the employee’s injury—was
decided by a non-Article III deputy commissioner of the United States
Employees’ Compensation Commission, whose decision was final subject only
to very deferential judicial review by an Article III court.16
The Court acknowledged Murray’s Lessee’s Article III dichotomy of
public rights versus private rights, and it concluded that the case before it
involved a determination of private rights.17 Nevertheless, the Court held that
(except in one respect irrelevant here), delegation of final fact-finding to the
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

Id. at 275.
Id.
Id. at 284.
Id. at 283–84.
See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
Id. at 37–38.
Id. at 43–44.
Id. at 50–51.
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deputy commissioner did not violate Article III.18 The Court likened the deputy
commissioner’s function to that of a jury or special master, as to whom, the
Court noted, “[I]t has not been the practice to disturb their findings when they
are properly based upon evidence, in the absence of errors of law.”19
B. Northern Pipeline v. Marathon Pipe Line: Formalism Over Balancing
As the above discussion suggests, the Court’s early Article III cases lacked
a coherent, unifying principle. Indeed, when the Court first considered the
impact of Article III on bankruptcy court adjudications in Northern Pipeline
Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., one Justice archly observed that
the Court’s previous Article III cases “do not admit of easy synthesis.”20 In
Marathon, a splintered Court disagreed on the appropriate approach to Article
III analysis; nevertheless, a majority of the Justices concluded that the
Bankruptcy Act of 1978 (the 1978 Act) violated Article III.21
The 1978 Act created bankruptcy courts as so-called “adjuncts” to the
federal district court in each district.22 The bankruptcy court judges were
appointed to fourteen-year terms by the President, with the advice and consent
of the Senate; their salaries were set by statute and could be adjusted by
Congress.23 The jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts was very broad,
extending to “all ‘civil proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related
to cases under title 11.’”24
Northern Pipeline had filed a petition for reorganization in the bankruptcy
court.25 Northern then filed suit in the bankruptcy court against Marathon Pipe
Line—an entity that was not otherwise a party in the bankruptcy case—
alleging breach of contract and other claims.26 The bankruptcy court denied
Marathon’s motion to dismiss that argued that the Bankruptcy Act
unconstitutionally conferred Article III judicial power on non-Article III

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

Id. at 95.
Id. at 51–52.
N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 91 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
Id. at 87 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 53.
Id.
Id. at 54 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (1976 ed., Supp. IV)) (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 56.
Id.
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judges, but the district court reversed.27 Northern appealed to the Supreme
Court.28
Justice Brennan’s four-justice plurality opinion began by emphasizing that
Article III served important structural interests as “[a]n inseparable element of
the constitutional system of checks and balances;” thus, the guarantees of life
tenure and an undiminished salary for federal judges “were incorporated into
the Constitution to ensure the independence of the Judiciary from the control
of the Executive and Legislative Branches of government.”29 Because
bankruptcy judges enjoyed neither of these guarantees, they clearly were not
Article III judges.30
The plurality then attempted to synthesize the previous case law. It asserted
that there were only “three narrow situations” that had been recognized as
exceptions to the Article III rule that the judicial power of the United States
must be vested in Article III courts: territorial courts (per Canter), military
courts (as the Court had recognized in other early cases), and “public rights”
cases (per Murray’s Lessee).31 The plurality defined “public rights” cases as
those where the government was a party.32 Concluding that Northern’s contract
action against Marathon fell within none of those categories—and particularly
noting that it involved not a “public right,” but rather a “state-created private
right[]”33—the plurality held that the Bankruptcy Act’s broad delegation to
non-Article III bankruptcy courts of the power to decide any civil proceeding
simply “related to” bankruptcy violated Article III.34
Concurring in the result for himself and Justice O’Connor, Justice
Rehnquist trenchantly noted that the Court’s previous Article III jurisprudence
was characterized by “frequently arcane distinctions and confusing
precedents,” and he expressed skepticism that Article III had “three tidy
exceptions, as the plurality believes.”35 Nevertheless, the concurring justices
27

Id. at 56–57.
Id. at 57.
29 Id. at 58, 59.
30 Id. at 60–61.
31 Id. at 64–67.
32 Id. at 67–68.
33 Id. at 71. The plurality thus distinguished Crowell v. Benson on the ground that that case dealt with a
federally-created right as to which Congress “possesses substantial discretion to prescribe the manner in which
that right may be adjudicated—including the assignment to an adjunct of some functions historically
performed by judges.” Id. at 80.
34 Id. at 87.
35 Id. at 90–91 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
28
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were “satisfied” that Northern’s lawsuit against Marathon—described by Chief
Justice Burger in dissent as “a ‘traditional’ state common-law action, not made
subject to a federal rule of decision, and related only peripherally to an
adjudication of bankruptcy under federal law”—could not be sustained under
the Court’s previous Article III cases.36
Justice White’s three-justice dissent described the Court’s previous
“confusing and controversial” Article III jurisprudence and took the plurality
opinion to task for its “gross oversimplification” of the law.37 Eschewing the
plurality’s and the Court’s own previous “unsuccessful attempt[s] to articulate
a principled” approach to Article III issues,38 the dissent employed a balancing
test that considered the strength of the legislative interest in assigning a
determination to a non-Article III tribunal, the relative strength of Article III
values in the particular circumstances, and “whether and to what extent the
legislative scheme accommodates [those values] or, conversely, substantially
undermines them.”39 Applying that balancing test, the dissent concluded that
the bankruptcy court system embodied in the 1978 Act did not violate Article
III because of (1) the availability of appellate review of bankruptcy court
determinations by Article III courts; (2) the absence of any indication the 1978
Act was an attempt by the political branches to take power from the judiciary;
and (3) the importance of the congressional goal that motivated the creation of
the bankruptcy courts—to efficiently deal with the “tremendous increase” in
bankruptcy filings that threatened otherwise to overwhelm the federal
judiciary.40
The Marathon case thus presented two very different recipes for Article III
analysis. The plurality pursued a formalistic approach, examining the nature of
the matter being adjudicated and determining whether it could be decided by a
non-Article III tribunal according to whether it fell within certain narrowlydefined categories. The dissent urged a more subjective analysis, weighing and
balancing the importance of congressional goals against Article III values and
the extent to which the latter might be compromised by the legislative scheme
in question.41
36

Id. at 91–92 (Rehnquist, J., concurring, & Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 93 (White, J., dissenting).
38 Id. at 105.
39 Id. at 115.
40 Id. at 116–17.
41 Id. To illustrate the formalistic nature of the plurality’s approach, the dissent pointed to Katchen v.
Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966), in which the Court had “recognized that [a bankruptcy] referee could adjudicate
counterclaims against a creditor who files his claim against the estate,” and reasoned that therefore “if
37
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C. Post-Marathon Cases: Balancing Ascendant
Although the Marathon decision was a victory for the Justices advocating
the formalistic approach to Article III analysis, it was to be short-lived. In the
Court’s next few Article III cases, it seemed as if Justice White’s balancing
approach in his Marathon dissent clearly had triumphed.
Thus, in Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., the Court
considered an Article III attack on a federal statute that required binding
arbitration, with limited appellate review, of disputes among pesticide
manufacturers (clearly a “private rights” dispute) who were subject to the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).42 Writing for the
majority, Justice O’Connor expressly rejected the formalistic approach, stating
that “practical attention to substance rather than doctrinaire reliance on formal
categories should inform application of Article III.”43 The majority examined
the substance of FIFRA and noted that under the Act the “danger of Congress
or the Executive encroaching on the Article III judicial powers” was minimal,
and it further observed that FIFRA “does provide for limited Article III review,
including whatever review is independently required by due process
considerations.”44 Weighing these factors, the majority found no Article III
violation.45
One year later, the Court reaffirmed its adherence to the balancing
approach. In Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, the Court
considered the constitutionality of a federal statute that created the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) to help regulate commodity futures
transactions.46 Among its statutory duties, the CFTC was to adjudicate claims
of the customers of professional commodity brokers that the brokers had
violated the statute or CFTC regulations.47 The CFTC route was not exclusive,

Marathon had filed a claim against the bankrupt in this case, the trustee could have filed and the bankruptcy
judge could have adjudicated a counterclaim seeking the relief that is involved in these cases.” Marathon Pipe
Line, 458 U.S. at 99–100 (White, J., dissenting). The plurality responded in a footnote that the earlier case had
“no discussion of the Art[icle] III issue.” Id. at 79 n.31 (plurality opinion). This question—whether a nonArticle III bankruptcy judge could constitutionally adjudicate a counterclaim—would become the central issue
in Stern. See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2600 (2011).
42 Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods., 473 U.S. 568, 571–73 (1985).
43 Id. at 587.
44 Id. at 591, 593.
45 Id. at 593–94.
46 Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 835–36 (1986).
47 Id. at 836.
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but rather was intended to be an “inexpensive and expeditious” alternative to
traditional judicial relief.48
An important feature of the CFTC system was a provision that permitted
the broker to bring any counterclaim against the customer that arose out of the
transactions about which the customer was complaining.49 In the case before
the Court, the customer had filed a CFTC complaint against the broker alleging
that the broker’s violations had caused losses and expenses to exceed funds
deposited, thus resulting in a debit balance in the customer’s account.50 The
broker counterclaimed, alleging the debit balance was the result of the
customer’s poor trading decisions and was therefore a simple debt owed to the
broker under state common law.51
When the court of appeals held that the counterclaim provision violated
Article III under Marathon,52 the Supreme Court granted the broker’s petition
for certiorari.53 Justice O’Connor wrote the opinion for the majority and once
again eschewed formalistic analysis. Her opinion noted initially that the
Court’s earlier cases—which had emphasized the structural, separation-ofpowers aspect of Article III—had “little occasion” to discuss the “personal”
interests protected by Article III.54 The opinion identified those personal
interests as a litigant’s “right to have claims decided before judges who are free
from potential domination by other branches of government.”55 Holding that
such personal interests can be waived—and finding that the customer did
waive them when he initially brought his claim against the broker before the
CFTC rather than in court—the Court concluded that the “personal” aspect of
Article III was no barrier to determination of the counterclaim by the CFTC.56
The Court then turned to the structural aspect of Article III, the separationof-powers guarantee that serves as “‘an inseparable element of the
constitutional system of checks and balances.’”57 As to this element of Article
III, consent could not provide a way out: “When these Article III limitations
are at issue, notions of consent and waiver cannot be dispositive because the
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57

Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 95-850, at 11 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2087, 2099).
Id. at 837.
Id. at 837–38.
Id. at 838.
Id. at 839.
Id. at 841.
Id. at 848.
Id. (quoting United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 218 (1980)).
Id. at 848–50.
Id. at 850 (quoting N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 58 (1982)).
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limitations serve institutional interests that the parties cannot be expected to
protect.”58
Declining to “adopt formalistic and unbending rules,” the opinion went on
to weigh “a number of factors,” including the extent to which the non-Article
III tribunal possessed the “‘essential attributes of judicial power’” as well as
the “concerns that drove Congress to depart from the requirements of Article
III.”59 The opinion concluded that the intrusion on Article III was de minimis,
while the congressional goal of furnishing a “prompt, continuous, expert and
inexpensive method for dealing with a class of questions of fact” was a worthy
one.60 Summing up, the opinion stated that because “due regard must be given
in each case to the unique aspects of the congressional plan at issue and its
practical consequences in light of the larger concerns that underlie Article III,”
the majority concluded the CFTC’s counterclaim authority passed muster
under Article III.61
Justice Brennan’s two-justice dissent reiterated the formalistic approach of
his plurality opinion in Marathon and harkened back to the language in
Murray’s Lessee that Congress could not “‘withdraw from [Article III] judicial
cognizance any matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the
common law.’”62
With the Schor decision, it appeared that an all-factors balancing test along
the lines urged by Justice White in his Marathon dissent had displaced
formalism as the Court’s prescribed method for analyzing Article III issues.
Indeed, one prominent academic critic of the Marathon plurality opinion,
Professor Erwin Chemerinsky, concluded that Thomas and Schor had
effectively overruled Marathon.63 And this was the state of the Court’s Article
III jurisprudence when it considered the authority of bankruptcy courts to
decide state-law counterclaims in Stern.

58

Id. at 851.
Id.
60 Id. at 856.
61 Id. at 857.
62 Id. at 861–62 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement
Co., 59 U.S. 272, 284 (1855)).
63 Erwin Chemerinsky, Ending the Marathon: It Is Time To Overrule Northern Pipeline, 65 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 311, 320 (1991).
59
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II. STERN V. MARSHALL: MARATHON REDUX
A. Overview of Facts
The archetypal story of Anna Nicole Smith’s marriage to octogenarian
billionaire J. Howard Marshall and the subsequent estate battle with her
stepson Pierce Marshall has become a staple of pop culture: how they met in
1991 when he was an 86-year-old oil tycoon and she was a 24-year-old dancer
at a bar; how soon thereafter she became a Playboy centerfold model, Playmate
of the Year, and international model for Guess jeans; how they married in
1994, against the wishes of J. Howard’s son Pierce and the rest of his family;
how, when J. Howard died in 1995, she was not mentioned in his will; and
how she and Pierce spent the next decade-and-a-half litigating against each
other—two times in the United States Supreme Court—and how their estates
continued the fight when both met untimely deaths.64
Less well known is the intricate procedural history of the litigation.
Although a comprehensive review of that history is unnecessary for purposes
of this article, the somewhat abbreviated summary below provides both the
flavor of what occurred and essential background to the case as decided by the
Supreme Court.65
Shortly after J. Howard died in August 1995, Pierce initiated a Texas
proceeding to probate the will.66 In early 1996, Vickie Lynn Marshall filed for
bankruptcy in California.67 Pierce filed an adversary complaint and creditor’s
claim in the bankruptcy proceeding alleging that Vickie, through her lawyers,
had defamed him by publicly accusing him of forgery, fraud, and overreaching
to gain control of J. Howard’s assets before his death.68
Vickie objected to the creditor’s claim, pleaded truth as an affirmative
defense and asserted a compulsory counterclaim against Pierce for tortious
64 Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 275 B.R. 5, 11–25 (C.D. Cal. 2002), vacated and remanded,
392 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2004), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293 (2006),
rev’d, 600 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011).
65 Although there have been a substantial number of published opinions in this matter, none includes a
complete explanation of the procedural history of the case. In its opinion, the Supreme Court relied on the
Court of Appeals Excerpts of Record and Supplemental Excerpts of Record, both publicly available
documents. See, e.g., Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2607 (2011).
66 5 Excerpts of Record at 836–45, Marshall v. Marshall, 600 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2010) (Nos. 02-56002,
02-56067).
67 In re Marshall, 275 B.R. at 8.
68 Id. at 8–9.
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interference with her expectancy of an inter vivos gift from J. Howard.69 In
March 1999, the bankruptcy court confirmed Vickie’s reorganization plan,
which provided that her creditors would be paid out of the proceeds, if any, of
her counterclaim against Pierce.70
The bankruptcy court resolved Pierce’s claim against him on summary
judgment.71 Pierce asserted that Vickie’s counterclaim was barred by the
“probate exception” to federal jurisdiction and that Vickie’s tortious
interference claim against him could only be heard in a Texas probate court.72
The bankruptcy court ruled against Pierce on the jurisdictional issue,73 tried
Vickie’s counterclaim, and held in her favor; it found that J. Howard had
instructed his lawyers to create an inter vivos trust for Vickie consisting of half
the appreciation in his assets from the time of their marriage, but that Pierce
had tortiously prevented it.74 The court awarded Vickie’s bankruptcy estate
$449 million in compensatory damages and $25 million in punitive damages,
entering final judgment in December 2000.75
When the bankruptcy court entered final judgment, the Texas probate trial
was in progress.76 Vickie immediately dismissed all her claims in the Texas
court.77 However, the probate court permitted Pierce to assert a new claim for
declarative relief against Vickie, asking for a declaration that Vickie never had
a “contract” with J. Howard for one-half his property.78 After a jury trial, the

69

Id. at 9.
29 Supplemental Excerpts of Record at 6065–91, Marshall v. Marshall, 600 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2010)
(Nos. 02-56002, 02-56067).
71 In re Marshall, 275 B.R. at 9.
72 Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 257 B.R. 35, 37 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2000), aff’d in part, vacated
in part, rev’d in part, 264 B.R. 609 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
73 Nevertheless, in an excess of caution, Vickie then filed a tortious interference claim against Pierce in
the Texas probate proceedings. 14 Excerpts of Record, supra note 66, at 2863; 38 Supplemental Excerpts of
Record, supra note 70, at 8426–27; 45 id. at 10306–09; 53 id. at 12453.
74 Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 253 B.R. 550, 560 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2000), adopted as
modified, 275 B.R. 5, 11–25 (C.D. Cal. 2002), vacated and remanded, 392 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2004), rev’d
and remanded sub nom. Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293 (2006), rev’d, 600 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2010), aff’d
sub nom. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011).
75 In re Marshall, 275 B.R. at 9–10.
76 In re Marshall, 253 B.R. at 561.
77 Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 392 F.3d 1118, 1128 (9th Cir. 2004), rev’d and remanded sub
nom. Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293 (2006), rev’d, 600 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Stern v.
Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011).
78 13 Excerpts of Record, supra note 66, at 2683; 19 id. at 3994–95; 38 Supplemental Excerpts of
Record, supra note 70, at 8609–16, 8638–39; 53 id. at 12260–61, 12453.
70
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probate court issued a judgment in December 2001 upholding J. Howard’s will
and finding in favor of Pierce’s declaratory relief claim against Vickie.79
Meanwhile in California, Pierce had appealed the bankruptcy court
judgment to the federal district court.80 The district court held that the “probate
exception” to federal jurisdiction did not apply; it also denied Pierce’s motion
to dismiss on the ground that the Texas probate judgment collaterally estopped
the counterclaim; however, relying on Marathon, it agreed with Pierce that the
bankruptcy court could not finally determine Vickie’s tortious interference
counterclaim consistent with Article III.81 Consequently, it concluded, it would
treat the bankruptcy court’s judgment as proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law and conduct a trial de novo of Vickie’s counterclaim.82
During the de novo trial, the district court examined all the evidence before
the bankruptcy court and substantial documentary evidence Pierce had
previously refused to produce; it also heard live testimony from key
witnesses.83 In March 2002, the district court entered judgment for Vickie.84 It
found that J. Howard had directed his lawyers to prepare an inter vivos trust for
Vickie consisting of one-half the appreciation of his assets during their
marriage, but Pierce had conspired to suppress or destroy the trust instrument
and to strip J. Howard of his assets by backdating and altering documents,
arranging for surveillance of J. Howard and Vickie, and presenting documents
to J. Howard under false pretenses.85 Based on these findings, the court
awarded Vickie $44.3 million in compensatory damages and, finding
“overwhelming” evidence of Pierce’s “willfulness, maliciousness and fraud,” it
awarded her another $44.3 million in punitive damages.86

79 18 Excerpts of Record, supra note 66, at 3782; 23 id. at 4706, 4736; 31 Supplemental Excerpts of
Record, supra note 70, at 6623–24; 53 id. at 12261, 12453–54.
80 Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 264 B.R. 609, 618 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
81 Id. at 625, 629, 633.
82 Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 275 B.R. 5, 10 (C.D. Cal. 2002), vacated and remanded, 392
F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2004), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293 (2006), rev’d,
600 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011).
83 Id. at 10.
84 Id. at 58.
85 Id. at 39–40, 45, 52.
86 Id. at 57–58.
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Pierce appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which reversed the judgment on the
jurisdictional “probate exception” ground.87 Vickie’s certiorari petition to the
Supreme Court was granted, and the high court unanimously reversed the
Ninth Circuit and remanded for consideration of the remaining appellate
issues.88 On remand,89 the Ninth Circuit again reversed the district court’s
judgment, this time on the ground that the judgment was collaterally estopped
by the Texas probate judgment that had been entered before it.90 In response to
Vickie’s argument that the bankruptcy court judgment, which preceded that of
the probate court, should be considered the first final judgment and therefore
preclusive of the probate court judgment, the Ninth Circuit held that the
bankruptcy court did not have authority consistent with Article III to issue a
final judgment on Vickie’s tort counterclaim.91 Vickie sought, and was again
granted, certiorari review in the Supreme Court on the question of whether the
bankruptcy court had the power, under Article III, to issue a final judgment on
her tortious interference counterclaim.92
B. Stern v. Marshall and The Return Of Formalism Over Balancing
When the Supreme Court considered the Article III issue in Stern, it
confronted a different bankruptcy scheme than was before it in Marathon. In
response to the Marathon ruling, Congress had held extensive hearings and
enacted a new bankruptcy act, the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984 (the 1984 Act), intended to address the Article III
problems identified by the Court.93
Under the new 1984 Act, the district courts were given “original and
exclusive jurisdiction” over all bankruptcy cases.94 The district courts were

87 Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 392 F.3d 1118, 1137 (9th Cir. 2004), rev’d and remanded sub
nom. Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293 (2006), rev’d, 600 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Stern v.
Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011).
88 Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 315 (2006), rev’d, 600 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom.
Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011).
89 Both Pierce and Vickie died before the Ninth Circuit ruled again; the case was pursued by their
respective estates. Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 600 F.3d 1037, 1040 n.1 (9th Cir. 2010), aff’d sub
nom. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011).
90 Id. at 1061.
91 Id. at 1068–69.
92 See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011).
93 See President Ronald Reagan, Statement on Signing the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984 (July 10, 1984), available at http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1984/
71084d.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2012).
94 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (2006).
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authorized to refer such cases to the bankruptcy courts in their districts, but
could withdraw a case from a bankruptcy court “for cause shown.”95
Bankruptcy judges for each district were appointed to fourteen-year terms by
the court of appeals for that district (in contrast to appointment by the President
with the advice and consent of Congress in the 1978 Act that was held
unconstitutional in Marathon).96
Congress also sought to address the Article III issue by making the scope of
a bankruptcy court’s authority dependent on the type of proceeding before it.
Thus, proceedings “arising under title 11, or arising in a case under title 11”
were designated “core” proceedings and the bankruptcy court could issue a
final judgment in such proceedings, subject to ordinary appellate review by the
district court.97 Proceedings that were not “core” but were “otherwise related to
a case under title 11” (like the proceeding against the third party in Marathon)
could be heard by the bankruptcy court, but in such matters the court could
only issue proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district
court, which had the sole authority to enter a final judgment in such matters
after de novo review.98 Section 157 of title 28 lists sixteen different types of
“core” matters, including “counterclaims by the [debtor’s] estate against
persons filing claims against the estate.”99 The latter provision provided the
statutory basis for the bankruptcy court’s entry of final judgment on Vickie’s
counterclaim.100
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for the five-justice majority begins by
disposing of two preliminary issues. First, the majority rejected Pierce’s
argument that the designation of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) “counterclaims” as
“core” was not a sufficient statutory basis for the bankruptcy court to enter
final judgment on the counterclaim.101 The majority concluded (and the dissent
agreed) that Congress intended “core” proceedings to be equivalent to
proceedings that arise under title 11 or in a title 11 case—and therefore were

95

Id. § 157(a), (d).
Id. § 152(a)(1).
97 Id. § 157(b)(1); see id. § 158(a).
98 Id. § 157(c)(1).
99 Id. § 157(b)(2)(C).
100 See Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 275 B.R. 5, 10 (C.D. Cal. 2002), vacated and remanded,
392 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2004), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293 (2006),
rev’d, 600 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011).
101 Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2604 (2011).
96
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proceedings in which bankruptcy courts were statutorily authorized to enter
final judgment.102
The majority also rejected Pierce’s argument that the bankruptcy court
lacked statutory authority to enter final judgment on his defamation claim (and
therefore on Vickie’s counterclaim) because the former was a “personal injury
tort” under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5).103 That statute provides that “[t]he district
court shall order that personal injury tort and wrongful death claims shall be
tried in the district court in which the bankruptcy case is pending, or in the
district court in the district in which the claim arose.”104 Without deciding
whether Pierce’s defamation claim was or was not a “personal injury tort”
within the meaning of the statute, the majority held that (1) the statute was not
jurisdictional, and hence was waivable; and (2) Pierce consented to the
bankruptcy court finally deciding his claim by expressly agreeing to it on
several occasions and failing to invoke § 157(b)(5) until two years after he
filed his claim in the bankruptcy court.105
Turning to the Article III issue, the majority relied heavily upon Murray’s
Lessee and Marathon to conclude that “in general, Congress may not
‘withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter which, from its nature, is the
subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty.’”106 Further,
“[w]hen a suit is made of ‘the stuff of the traditional actions at common law
tried by the courts at Westminster in 1789,’ and is brought within the bounds
of federal jurisdiction, the responsibility for deciding that suit rests with Article
III judges in Article III courts.”107 The majority concluded that it was “clear
that the [b]ankruptcy [c]ourt in this case exercised the ‘judicial Power of the
United States’ in purporting to resolve and enter final judgment on a state
common[-]law claim, just as the court did in [Marathon].”108
The majority then distinguished the previous Supreme Court cases that had
recognized “exceptions” to Article III. First, it held that the “public rights”
exception did not apply because the Court had “limit[ed] the exception to cases
in which the claim at issue derives from a federal regulatory scheme, or in
102

Id. at 2604–05.
Id. at 2606–07.
104 Id. at 2606 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5)).
105 Id. at 2606–08.
106 Id. at 2597 (quoting Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 284 (1855)).
107 Id. at 2609 (quoting N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 90 (1982)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring)).
108 Id. at 2611.
103
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which resolution of the claim by an expert government agency is deemed
essential to a limited regulatory objective within the agency’s authority.”109
Next, it held that the fact that Pierce had filed a claim in Vickie’s bankruptcy
case, and thus was not a new party to the action as in Marathon, made no
difference because Vickie’s counterclaim would not be resolved by
determination of Pierce’s claim, and the counterclaim was not a right of
recovery created by federal bankruptcy law.110 Finally, the majority concluded
that bankruptcy courts could not be considered “adjuncts” to Article III
courts—even though bankruptcy judges were appointed by the federal courts
of appeals and any bankruptcy matter could be removed to a district court for
good cause.111 The majority explained that bankruptcy courts could not be
mere “adjuncts,” because the bankruptcy courts “do not ‘ma[k]e only
specialized, narrowly confined factual determinations regarding a
particularized area of law’ or engage in ‘statutorily channeled factfinding
functions.’”112
The majority opinion ends with the observation that its “narrow” decision
“does not change all that much,” but that a “statute may no more lawfully chip
away at the authority of the Judicial Branch than it may eliminate it
entirely.”113
Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion lamented that the “sheer surfeit” of
distinctions the majority opinion was forced to draw was an indication “that
something is seriously amiss with our jurisprudence in this area.”114 He pointed
out, for example, that there is no reason to conclude from Article III that
“state-law claims [as opposed to federal claims] have preferential entitlement
to an Article III judge.”115 Finally, he queried whether “historical practice
permits non-Article III judges to process claims against the bankruptcy estate,”
although he stated no position on the unbriefed issue.116
Justice Breyer’s four-justice dissent criticized the majority for its reliance
on formalistic decisions such as Murray’s Lessee and Marathon, and for its
understatement of the significance of more recent decisions such as Thomas
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116

Id. at 2613.
Id. at 2617–18.
Id. at 2618–19.
Id. at 2618–19 (quoting Marathon Pipe Line, 458 U.S. at 85).
Id. at 2620.
Id. at 2621 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
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and Schor that employed a balancing test.117 The dissent then adopted the more
“pragmatic” approach of those later cases to determine “‘the practical effect
that the congressional action will have on the constitutionally assigned role of
the federal judiciary.’”118 Weighing five factors, the dissent concluded: (1)
although the nature of Vickie’s bankruptcy counterclaim—which
“resemble[d]” a common-law tort action—weighed against non-Article III
determination, that factor was mitigated by the fact that bankruptcy courts
frequently decide similar state common-law-type claims by creditors; (2) the
nature of the non-Article III tribunal weighed in favor of constitutionality
because bankruptcy judges are appointed by and removable only by the federal
courts of appeal and their salaries are pegged to that of federal district court
judges, and hence they “enjoy considerable protection from improper political
influence;” (3) the fact that Article III judges exercise control over bankruptcy
proceedings, including by way of the right to withdraw and through appellate
review, weighed in favor of constitutionality; (4) the fact that Pierce had
voluntarily appeared in the bankruptcy proceedings to prosecute his claim
against Vickie’s bankruptcy estate, thus subjecting himself to the bankruptcy
court’s equitable power to restructure debtor-creditor relations, weighed in
favor of constitutionality; and finally (5) the nature and importance of the
legislative purpose argued in favor of constitutionality, since bankruptcy court
authority to finally decide counterclaims was necessary “to create an efficient,
effective federal bankruptcy system.”119
The dissent ends by expressing some skepticism at the majority’s assertion
that its decision “does not change all that much.”120 It pointed out that
bankruptcy filings dwarf all other filings in the district courts (1.6 million
bankruptcy cases versus 280,000 civil and 78,000 criminal) and that disputes
involving state-law claims and counterclaims arise frequently in the
bankruptcy courts.121 Thus, the dissent predicted “a constitutionally required
game of jurisdictional ping-pong between courts” that will cause “inefficiency,
increased cost, delay, and needless additional suffering among those faced with
bankruptcy.”122

117
118
119
120
121
122

Id. at 2622–26 (Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, & Kagan, JJ., dissenting).
Id. at 2625 (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986)).
Id. at 2626–29.
Id. at 2629.
Id. at 2630.
Id.
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The Stern majority opinion represents a resurgence of the formalistic
approach to Article III analysis and a defeat for the more pragmatic balancing
approach the Court seemed to have adopted in the cases immediately following
the Marathon plurality decision. Whether that change in approach will have
significant practical consequences remains to be seen—although, as noted at
the outset of this article, in its immediate aftermath, the opinion is being
invoked in courts across the country as a “game changer.”123 What is certain is
that the opinion has the potential to have dramatic impact on the scope of
authority of non-Article III tribunals, as explained below.
III. ANALYSIS OF STERN V. MARSHALL AND THE ARTICLE III CONSENT
PROBLEM
Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion in Stern begins with a quote from
Dickens’s Bleak House, comparing the novel’s endless case of Jarndyce v.
Jarndyce to the lengthy proceedings that preceded the most recent Supreme
Court opinion in the Marshall litigation.124 But the sad irony is that one of the
principal reasons the Marshall lawsuit dragged on for so long was that the
district court determined that it was required to conduct a de novo trial because
the bankruptcy court lacked authority to enter a final judgment under Article
III!125 In other words, the Stern majority’s holding institutionalizes a rule that
played a substantial part in causing the very delays in litigation that the
majority laments.
But the Stern opinion’s return to a formalistic approach to Article III could
have much more serious consequences than simply delaying some
bankruptcies. The reason for that stems from the fact that Article III serves two
prophylactic functions—a personal one (it protects individual litigants by
safeguarding their “right to have claims decided by judges who are free from
potential domination by other branches of government”)126 and a structural one
(it is “an inseparable element of the constitutional system of checks and
balances”).127

123 See Order, supra note 3; see also Adam Lewis et al., Stern v. Marshall: A Jurisdictional Game
Changer?, 2011 PRATT’S J. BANKR. L. 483.
124 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2600.
125 See Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 275 B.R. 5, 10 (C.D. Cal. 2002), vacated and remanded,
392 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2004), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293 (2006),
rev’d, 600 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011).
126 United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 218 (1980).
127 N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 459 U.S. 50, 58 (1982).
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The Supreme Court explained the significance of the dual nature of Article
III in Schor. There the Court held that “as a personal right, Article III’s
guarantee of an impartial and independent federal adjudication is subject to
waiver, just as are other personal constitutional rights that dictate the
procedures by which civil and criminal matters must be tried.”128 By contrast,
with respect to the structural function of Article III,
the parties cannot by consent cure the constitutional difficulty for the
same reason that the parties by consent cannot confer on federal
courts subject-matter jurisdiction beyond the limitations imposed by
Article III, § 2 . . . . When these Article III limitations are at issue,
notions of consent and waiver cannot be dispositive because the
limitations serve institutional interests that the parties cannot be
129
expected to protect.

The potential consequences of the non-waivability of the structural aspect
of Article III are profound. On the most immediate level, claims against a
bankruptcy estate will frequently have the very characteristics that led the
Stern majority to conclude that Vickie’s counterclaim had to be heard by an
Article III tribunal. Like that counterclaim, claims against a bankruptcy estate
are often state-based, common-law claims that fail to fit within any of the
exceptions discussed in the Stern opinion.130 Does that mean that one of the
most fundamental, “core” functions of a bankruptcy court—the final
determination of a claim against the bankruptcy estate—could be
unconstitutional under the reasoning of Stern? If consent or waiver cannot
wholly cure an Article III violation, it would certainly seem so. Indeed, Justice
Scalia raised that very specter in his concurring opinion, stating that because
the issue had not been briefed, he “state[d] no position on” whether “nonArticle III judges [could] process claims against the bankruptcy estate.”131
But the potential implications of Stern are far broader. Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 157(c)(2), a bankruptcy judge is permitted to finally determine any “related

128

Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986).
Id. at 851.
130 See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2603–04 (2011).
131 Id. at 2621 (Scalia, J., concurring). Significantly, Justice Scalia is not the only member of the Court to
have had this problem in mind. The first question at the Stern oral argument, asked by Justice Sotomayor, was,
“What’s the authority at all for a bankruptcy court to adjudicate proof of claims, without violating Article III?”
Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011) (No. 10-179). And at the end of
the argument, Justice Breyer asked, “Structurally, it does injure the—the prestige or something or the structure
or the integrity of the [f]ederal [g]overnment—judiciary, [f]ederal judiciary—to allow the bankruptcy judge to
adjudicate a direct claim; why is a counterclaim different?” Id. at 52–53.
129
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to” proceeding “with the consent of all of the parties.”132 This provision
permits the parties to agree to have most or all of the contested proceedings in
a bankruptcy heard solely in the bankruptcy court, thus allowing them to take
advantage of the relative efficiency of bankruptcy courts rather than competing
for time on crowded district court dockets. Particularly where the bankruptcy
estate is relatively small, keeping the entire matter in the bankruptcy court may
be the only way to preserve the estate against excessive costs. Yet it is difficult
to see how this statute, at least on its face, could survive an Article III attack
with respect to state-law proceedings, in light of the Stern holding and the nonwaivability of Article III structural protections.
And the implications are even broader. Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), nonArticle III United States magistrate judges may, “[u]pon the consent of the
parties, . . . conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and
order the entry of judgment in the case.”133 The breadth of the statute surely
encompasses state-law-based common-law proceedings like Vickie’s
counterclaim that may be in federal court under diversity or pendent
jurisdiction. In fact, in a pending case, the Fifth Circuit has requested briefing
on “whether, under Stern, a magistrate judge can enter final judgment in a case
tried to a magistrate judge by consent . . . where jurisdiction is based on
diversity of citizenship and state law provides the rule of decision.”134
Moreover, these same principles would seem to threaten the tenability of
much of the arbitration conducted under the Federal Arbitration Act, which
permits parties to agree to determination of legal disputes by private, nonArticle III adjudicators subject only to very limited judicial review by Article
III courts—far more limited review than the ordinary appellate review by
Article III district courts available in the bankruptcy setting.135 Because the
Federal Arbitration Act applies to all contracts involving interstate
commerce,136 the scope of the civil disputes that it encompasses is enormously
broad and unquestionably includes state-law matters. Indeed, there had been
suggestions that arbitration presented troubling Article III problems even
before Stern.137

132

28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) (2006).
Id. § 636 (c)(1).
134 Order, supra note 3, at 2.
135 See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006).
136 Id. § 2; see id. § 1 (defining “commerce” broadly as “commerce among the several States or with
foreign nations”); see also Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 13 (1984).
137 See, e.g., Peter B. Rutledge, Arbitration and Article III, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1189, 1191 (2008).
133
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In each of the above instances, the non-Article III tribunal frequently, even
typically, adjudicates state common-law claims—“the stuff of the traditional
actions at common law tried by the courts at Westminster in 1789” that the
Stern majority held could not be withdrawn from the federal judiciary
consistent with Article III.138 The tribunals in question are neither territorial
courts nor military courts, the tribunals that are historical exceptions to Article
III.139 Nor can the purely private disputes being resolved in those tribunals be
considered “public rights” as that term was construed by the Stern majority;
rather, like the counterclaim in Stern, a typical claim in those tribunals “does
not ‘depend[] on the will of [C]ongress;’ Congress has nothing to do with
it.”140 Finally, as in Stern, in each instance cited above the non-Article III
tribunal is not “an agency but . . . a court, with substantive jurisdiction
reaching any area of the corpus juris.”141 In short, none of the circumstances
cited above falls within any of the Stern majority’s formalistic, categorical
exceptions to Article III.
Of course, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court is actively searching for
opportunities to invalidate large chunks of the law that provide alternative,
more efficient—and often less costly—means of dispute resolution than
traditional Article III courts. But as the Stern majority reminds us, “‘the fact
that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating
functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the
Constitution.’”142 The Stern Court’s resurrection of Article III formalism,
coupled with the principle of non-waivability of the structural aspects of
Article III, are therefore not a trivial threat to the viability of all of the above
forms of non-Article III adjudication.
But perhaps the Stern Court is not serious about the non-waivability of
Article III’s structural guarantees. After all, the Stern majority did hold that
Pierce had waived his right to district court determination of his purported
“personal injury tort” claim under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5).143 The difficulty with
taking much solace from that holding is that it involved purely an issue of
statutory interpretation, and thus provides no insight into how the Court would
138 Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2609 (2011) (quoting N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 90 (1982)).
139 See Marathon Pipe Line, 458 U.S. at 64–67.
140 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2614 (quoting Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S.
272, 284 (1855)) (citation omitted).
141 Id. at 2615.
142 Id. at 2619 (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983)).
143 Id. at 2607–08.
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view the issue through a constitutional, Article III lens. And in any event, even
if the Court’s willingness to recognize the viability of consent in statutory
circumstances generally analogous to Article III indicated a sympathy for the
concept in a constitutional setting, that does not answer the crucial question: If
the only exceptions to Article III are the formal categories identified in Stern,
and if the structural guarantees of Article III may not be waived by the parties
(a proposition the Court has never questioned), what is the way out? How can a
bankruptcy court, federal magistrate, or arbitrator constitutionally decide a
state-law claim that does not fall within the Article III exceptions identified in
Stern—whether the parties consent or not?
Justice Scalia’s concurrence suggests one possible way out. He indicates
that he would be willing to uphold bankruptcy court authority to finally
adjudicate claims against the bankruptcy estate if “historical practice”
permitted it.144 Perhaps “historical practice” would also establish that at the
time Article III was drafted there were non-Article III institutions similar to
federal magistrates and arbitrators, who could make binding legal decisions
when the parties agreed to it.
Professor Ralph Brubaker has also suggested that one potential escape
route is the argument that “as a practical matter, structural separation-ofpowers concerns . . . do not pose any significant threat to the independence and
impartiality of non-Article III bankruptcy judges as the system is currently
structured (particularly since reappointment decisions reside in the Article III
judiciary itself).”145 Of course, that argument did not hold sway in Stern, in
which the Court concluded that “it does not matter who appointed the
bankruptcy judge or authorized the judge to render final judgments in such
proceedings.”146 Nevertheless, Professor Brubaker’s point remains a cogent
one, applicable as well to adjudication by federal magistrates and arbitrators.
The fact is that none of these institutions represents any attempt by the
legislative or executive branch to seize power from the judiciary, and in none
do the political branches exercise power that would affect the impartiality of
the tribunals. The problem is that this sort of pragmatic analysis has no place in
the Stern majority’s formalistic approach to Article III.

144

Id. at 2621 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Ralph Brubaker, Article III’s Bleak House (Part II): The Constitutional Limits of Bankruptcy Judges’
Core Jurisdiction, 31 BANKR. L. LETTER, Sept. 2011, at 1, 19.
146 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2619.
145
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Taken to its logical conclusion, the formalistic approach of the Stern
majority threatens a significant number of non-Article III institutions. Thus far,
only Justice Scalia has indicated he is prepared to take it to its logical
conclusion—although he has also suggested a way out, at least with respect to
claims against a bankruptcy estate. It will be interesting to see over the next
few years if the other justices in the majority are willing to go that far.
CONCLUSION
The issue in Stern v. Marshall was seemingly narrow—whether a nonArticle III bankruptcy court could finally decide a state-law-based
counterclaim against a party who had filed a claim against the bankruptcy
estate. The majority opinion resurrected the formalistic approach to Article III
jurisprudence that the Court seemed to have abandoned in the early 1980’s,
immediately following the Marathon decision. Employing that approach, the
Stern majority looked at the nature of the proceeding and the nature of the nonArticle III tribunal and determined that neither fit within any of the categorical
exceptions to Article III. The dissent would have followed the balancing
approach of the post-Marathon cases and weighed a number of factors,
including the extent of the intrusion on Article III and the importance of the
legislative objective in assigning the matter to a non-Article III tribunal.
The problem with the majority’s formalistic approach is its inflexibility.
Article III courts are swamped with cases, and requiring non-Article III
tribunals to fit into a limited number of historical exceptions will stymie
Congress’s efforts to establish alternative methods of dispute resolution that
present no serious threat to Article III values. The problem is particularly acute
because it is established that Article III’s structural aspect cannot be waived by
the parties. What this appears to mean is that parties who are perfectly satisfied
litigating outside the Article III courts are, by the logic of the Stern holding,
foreclosed from doing so.
Something’s got to give. The majority’s formalistic approach, coupled with
non-waivability, would seem to threaten practices such as bankruptcy court
determination of claims and binding arbitration. It seems far-fetched, if not
impossible, that the Court will strike down these long-accepted non-Article III
alternatives to federal court litigation. But in order to uphold them, the Court
must either find a way to fit them into an historical pigeonhole, adopt an
approach more akin to the dissent’s balancing test, or modify or abandon the
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doctrine of non-waivability. It may be years before we know how the
conundrum is solved.

